As AUKUS reaches its fifth anniversary, a strong navy has never been more important for Australia.
But that recognition is not what is remarkable five years on. It is a persistent, if often misunderstood, feature of Australian strategic thinking.
What is remarkable is the political resilience of AUKUS across all three countries, despite elections and changes of government. Political resilience has often been what ultimately undid Australia’s aspirations to build the naval capability it requires.
Much has changed since AUKUS was announced, both geopolitically and domestically. Front and centre is an increasingly interventionist and transactional US administration. Following Donald Trump’s return, many predicted a more isolationist United States, with dire implications for AUKUS.
Instead, Washington has become more willing to speak frankly about alliances. Much like Richard Nixon’s Guam doctrine in 1969, the message is that allies should take greater responsibility for their conventional defence, which requires investment. Australia acquiring nuclear-powered submarines to shoulder more of its defence aligns with this.
Recent US decision-making gives Australia reason to think seriously about the partner to which it is allied. But Australian anxiety about US reliability is hardly new. Trump’s language may be different; debates about dependence, abandonment and entrapment have run through the 75 years of the alliance.
What has changed dramatically is the security environment and states’ willingness to use military force.
Australia’s 2020 Defence Strategic Update foreshadowed this shift when it abandoned the assumption of 10 years’ strategic warning time that had underpinned defence planning for decades. But those on the COVID-era call announcing AUKUS could hardly have foreseen how quickly that judgment would be vindicated.
Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 and has since prosecuted hybrid attacks across Europe. The Middle East has returned to widespread conflict. State-based armed conflicts have reached record levels.
For Australia, another trend matters: shipping and maritime access have again become targets of warfare.
Australia is the fifth-largest user of shipping services in the world and more than 99 percent of its international trade by volume travels by sea. China’s navy is thought to have grown by an estimated 40 battle-force since AUKUS was announced; four times the size of Australia’s historically small surface combatant fleet of 10 warships.
With interstate conflict rising and maritime trade vulnerable to coercion, it makes sense for Australia to invest in highly capable submarines. But what of AUKUS itself?
Despite persistent claims that AUKUS is failing, public support remains resilient.
The 2026 Lowy Institute Poll found 68 percent support acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, despite confidence in Trump falling to 21 percent and trust in the US to 31 percent.
Australians appear able to distinguish a US president from the capability Australia needs.
There are real challenges, and AUKUS will not proceed exactly as planned. The most significant is the submarine industrial base and workforce challenge across all three countries.
Being on track does not mean being risk-free. It means known risks are acknowledged and being mitigated. No complex, multi-decade defence program is risk-free.
When AUKUS was announced, US Virginia-class production already suffered from workforce and industrial pressures and has struggled to achieve the sustained production rate required. The British submarine industrial base faces serious pressures of its own.
Yet, expanding the submarine industrial base across all three countries is itself an AUKUS objective. The challenge is part of the program, not evidence that its rationale has disappeared.
The optimal pathway was agreed within 18 months of the announcement, treaties have been signed between all three countries and training is progressing at pace. Australian submariners are moving rapidly through the Virginia-class training pipeline, with personnel equivalent to three Collins-class crews having now passed through.
But AUKUS’s most significant achievement is its endurance through extraordinary political change: two prime ministers in Australia, two presidents in the US, five prime ministers in Britain, and reviews in Washington and London. Governments have shifted left and right, yet AUKUS has persisted.
Why? Because successive governments in all three countries have concluded that AUKUS serves their national interests and the capability it promises matters in a more dangerous world. AUKUS’s remarkable political resilience should give Australia confidence despite the substantial risks.
Australia has several realities to confront. The world has become more dangerous and the prospect of conflict or military coercion in our region has increased.
As a middle power, Australia does not seek conflict. But neither is it in our interests to be unable to protect our vital interests, including the maritime system on which our prosperity depends. A strong navy is central to doing so, and the trend in naval warfare favours undersea power in nuclear-powered submarines.
There are trade-offs in gaining access to nuclear-powered submarine technology. But such a capability ultimately makes Australia more capable of defending itself, not less.
Throughout our history, Australian strategists have recognised our maritime dependence as a strategic vulnerability and the need for a strong navy to protect it. What Australia has often lacked is the political will to make the necessary investment.
That is what makes AUKUS remarkable, five years on.
This is a lightly edited version of an article that first appeared in the Australian Financial Review.
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