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Australia should work to block Myanmar’s Russian nuclear power plant

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Australia should work to block Myanmar’s Russian nuclear power plant
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Australia needs to urgently work with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Quad to prevent construction of Myanmar’s proposed Russia-backed nuclear power plant. Should the proposal be implemented, it would create serious regional security challenges. Amid Myanmar’s civil war, fragmented governance and illicit trafficking networks, Australia should not trust that nuclear materials and infrastructure could be adequately safeguarded.

To date, there has been no public statement from Canberra on the proposal. Australia’s efforts have been made through targeted sanctions to Russian entities involved in nuclear energy as part of its response to Moscow’s invasion to Ukraine, though this is likely not enough. Therefore Australia should work with both ASEAN and the Quad to strengthen transparency, nuclear oversight and regional preparedness before construction advances.

Myanmar’s civil war already complicates efforts to dismantle scam-centre networks and regulate extraction of critical minerals. Nuclear development would introduce the additional problem of strategic materials and infrastructure requiring secure custody and sustained institutional oversight. One of the most pressing concerns is determining how to prevent malicious actors from acquiring nuclear materials, and how to neutralise any actions they might take.

In March 2025, Russia and Myanmar signed an intergovernmental agreement to develop a 110-megawatt nuclear power plant, possibly expanding to 330-megawatt capacity. The initial project would use two small modular reactors built and designed by Russia. In August 2026, Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation, Rosatom, said that it expected to sign a contract for initial engineering surveys this year and that construction work would begin in 2027. Potential locations include areas near Naypyitaw, in central Bago, and in the Dawei special economic zones in southern Myanmar, where the junta and Russia have announced plans for a port and an oil refinery. In return, Russia would gain access to Myanmar’s offshore oil and gas.

Although the relationship between Russia and Myanmar is largely transactional, the two regimes describe it as one of trust and friendship. Min Aung Hlaing, inaugurated as Myanmar president in April after an election that UN experts and Canberra judged as neither free nor fair, has visited Russia repeatedly to gain international recognition. The United Nations reported in May 2023 that Russia had supplied US$406 million (A$581 million) worth of weapons since the coup, making it one of Myanmar’s principal suppliers, alongside China. For a junta desperate for recognition and weapons to sustain its constested grip, the proposed nuclear power plant offers infrastructure and a sense of international acceptance.

For Moscow, a foothold in Southeast Asia demonstrates that it still maintains reach beyond its traditional sphere. It also grants Russia a continuing influence through construction, training and servicing.

To be clear, a civilian reactor agreement between the Kremlin and the Myanmar junta does not imply the threat of a nuclear weapons program. But, the junta’s shadowy relationships with Russia, North Korea, Iran and China, along with its domestic instability, raise concern on safeguards, including who would enforce safety requirements within the country and maintain control of nuclear materials during a political crisis.

Myanmar’s ASEAN neighbours could put pressure on the junta not to proceed. But if they do not, ASEAN as a whole should ensure it has timely access to information on any incidents that pose risks beyond Myanmar’s borders. Australia’s distance means it is less directly exposed, but regional disruption and nuclear trafficking could still impact its security.

For example, Japanese national Takeshi Ebisawa pleaded guilty last year to trafficking nuclear materials from Myanmar to a purported Iranian buyer. He sought to exchange it for military-grade weapons, including surface-to-air missiles, for ethnic armed organisations in Myanmar. A New York district judge sentenced Ebisawa to 20 years in prison in March for offences involving nuclear materials, narcotics, firearms and money laundering, as he was also attempting to sell methamphetamine and heroin to the city. This demonstrates Canberra’s need to cooperate against crime networks, as Australians already feel the effects of Myanmar’s expanding scam centres.

Canberra should use this month’s ASEAN summit and Quad meetings in Manila to assess what action can be taken. Sharing nuclear-trafficking intelligence, financial investigations and forensic analysis would benefit all like-minded nations. The Ebisawa investigation was led by the US but received assistance from partners including India, Japan, Indonesia and Thailand. That experience provides a foundation for cooperation linking nuclear expertise with investigations into arms, drugs and money laundering. Quad partners could offer expertise and resources to ASEAN members, while regional authorities help Myanmar  identify their operational needs.

Canberra should also work with ASEAN’s chair, the Philippines, and Indonesia, Australia’s ASEAN country coordinator for 2024–27, to advance regional nuclear preparedness. The ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy could suggest mechanisms for nuclear safety, security and safeguards, emergency preparedness and measures against illicit trafficking. Australia could contribute expertise through its nuclear bodies, the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency and the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, working with the International Atomic Energy Agency and regional counterparts. Australia can encourage these groups to facilitate nuclear-related discussions and come together as the key oversight body for protection of both the people of Myanmar and its neighbours.

The Russia-Myanmar power plant proposal is yet another example of why nuclear safety guardrails are vital. ASEAN and the Quad should prioritise both the prevention of its implementation and the preparedness of the region should the plant materialise.

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