Rather than waiting for all four BCIM members to reach a consensus, Beijing now appears to be pursuing a phased approach by first advancing cooperation with Bangladesh and Myanmar while keeping the door open for India’s future participation. For China, the proposal offers another potential connection between Yunnan province and the Bay of Bengal. For Bangladesh, it could improve access to western China and strengthen links with Southeast Asia while reducing transport costs.
The economic logic is attractive. China is already Bangladesh’s largest source of imports, supplying goods worth around US$18 billion (Opens in new window) in 2024–25. Yet Bangladesh exports less than US$1 billion annually to China, highlighting the scale of the trade imbalance.
Rahman urged (Opens in new window)China to import more Bangladeshi pharmaceuticals, leather, aquatic products, and fruits, while Beijing reaffirmed support for the proposed corridor.
Better connectivity could help Bangladeshi exporters reach Chinese consumers and attract manufacturing investment. Trade with Chinese provinces near Yunnan remains limited but is growing, with exports to Bangladesh rising from US$112 million in 2019 to US$397 million in 2025 (Opens in new window).
However, drawing a corridor on a map is easier than building one on the ground.
Any overland route from China to Bangladesh must cross Myanmar, a country divided by civil war since the military coup of February 2021. Resistance groups now control (Opens in new window)large areas along Myanmar’s borders while the military continues trying to retake key territory.
In western Myanmar, the Arakan Army controls most of Rakhine State, which borders Bangladesh and includes the coastal areas through which any overland corridor would likely pass. Fighting has repeatedly spilled across the border (Opens in new window), while Bangladesh already hosts more than 1 million Rohingya refugees.
The route is therefore not simply an infrastructure challenge. China would need to manage relationships with Myanmar’s military government and several armed organisations controlling territory along potential transport routes.
Beijing has invested billions of dollars (Opens in new window) in Myanmar’s pipelines and infrastructure and maintains ties with both the military and some armed groups to protect its investments. Yet the Arakan Army remains active in Rakhine, the region most relevant to Bangladesh.
China’s existing Myanmar corridor runs from Yunnan through Mandalay to Kyaukphyu on the Bay of Bengal, where Beijing has invested in oil and gas pipelines and a planned deep-sea port. Extending this network towards Bangladesh could expand China’s commercial presence in the Bay of Bengal.
However, claims that it would allow China to bypass the Strait of Malacca should be treated cautiously. An overland route through conflict-affected Myanmar cannot match the scale or cost-efficiency of maritime trade. Its real value would be regional, linking Yunnan, Myanmar and Bangladesh through trade and logistics networks.
India will nevertheless watch the proposal closely (Opens in new window). A corridor involving Bangladesh and Myanmar would run near India’s sensitive northeastern states. It would also show that regional connectivity projects can proceed without New Delhi when India is unwilling to participate in Chinese initiatives.
The proposed corridor also intersects with another sensitive project: the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (TRCMRP (Opens in new window)) in northern Bangladesh. China recently reaffirmed support for the nearly US$1 billion river restoration initiative.
The project lies close to India’s strategically important Siliguri Corridor, or “Chicken’s Neck”, linking mainland India with its seven northeastern states. While Dhaka views the Teesta project as a development initiative to revive northern Bangladesh, many Indian analysts see a growing Chinese presence near one of India’s most sensitive strategic corridors, illustrating how infrastructure projects in South Asia increasingly carry geopolitical significance alongside economic objectives.
It remains far too early to judge whether the corridor will materialise. However, the proposal is notable for what it reveals about China’s evolving regional strategy. Rather than waiting for broader consensus, Beijing appears increasingly willing to pursue smaller, more flexible partnerships in South Asia. For Bangladesh, that could create new opportunities, while also placing the country more squarely within the strategic calculations of both China and India.
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