During the latest Senate committee hearing on government spending, the army’s A$1.2 billion acquisition of 75 M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks came under fire.
Senator Fatima Payman asked why Defence was investing so heavily in a capability that had not been used in more than 50 years. After all, Australia hadn’t deployed tanks in combat since the Vietnam War, she said.
The exchange highlighted a fundamental misunderstanding about the purpose of military capability. Australia does not acquire equipment because it expects to use it in combat. It buys it to deter war and to be able to fight and win if deterrence fails.
Chief of Army Lieutenant General Susan Coyle made this case directly, describing tanks as ‘an important part of our capability of the Australian Army in order for us to be able to fight and win the land combat battle’. She reinforced their strategic value, adding, ‘They are an incredibly potent capability, and they also form a part of our deterrence.’
Defence Secretary Meghan Quinn supported this argument, explaining that the National Defence Strategy is built around strategic denial and deterrence, with credible military capability intended to make potential adversaries think twice before engaging in armed conflict. ‘Just to be clear’, she said, ‘we do not buy equipment in the hopes of using it’.
It’s important to recognise that the current acquisition of Abrams tanks is not introducing a new capability into service but upgrading an established and proven one that has served Australia and its allies well.
Australia’s experience with tanks dates back to the deployment of M3 Stuart light tanks at Buna and Sanananda in Papua in 1942–43, followed by Matildas supporting infantry during the amphibious campaign at Balikpapan in 1945. In Vietnam, Centurions provided critical support to Australian infantry, including during the Battle of Binh Ba in 1969.
These operations demonstrated the value of integrating armour with infantry and engineers in difficult terrain and close combat. They also challenge the assumption that tanks have little relevance to Australia’s regional operating environment.
The ability to deploy protected firepower in support of amphibious and littoral operations remains relevant to the army’s contemporary strategic direction, as evidenced in the 2026 National Defence Strategy. The strategy directs the army to optimise for littoral manoeuvre and long-range strike while continuing to invest in a combined-arms land system.
As analyst William Leben has argued, tanks and other armoured vehicles are fundamental building blocks of combined-arms warfare, but their effectiveness depends on the integration of infantry, artillery, aviation, engineers and other supporting capabilities. The case for armour rests on what it enables the broader land force to achieve, not on the vehicle itself.
The proliferation of drones, loitering munitions, precision-guided weapons and anti-tank missiles has fundamentally changed the threat environment for heavy armour. While these developments have increased the vulnerability of armoured vehicles, they have not diminished their relevance on the modern battlefield.
The Australian Army Research Centre’s ‘The Lessons of Ukraine for the Australian Army’, published in 2016, argues that high-quality armour and artillery remain essential to a land force. Modern protection systems, combined with effective artillery fire, reconnaissance and electronic warfare, continue to provide significant battlefield advantages.
Alongside the 75 Abrams tanks, Land 907, the army’s heavy armour upgrade project, includes assault-breaching vehicles, armoured recovery vehicles, joint assault bridges and associated training and simulation systems. These are not ancillary investments; they are essential to enabling armour to manoeuvre, overcome obstacles and remain operational in contested environments.
The Senate hearing exchange highlights why defence investment needs to be assessed against the capability it generates, rather than the acquisition cost of individual platforms.
Australia’s lack of tank deployments in combat since Vietnam does not diminish the value of maintaining a credible armoured capability, just as the value of simulators cannot be judged solely by comparing their cost with the number of tanks acquired.
Heavy armour remains an important component of a credible land combat capability. Its combination of protected mobility, firepower and shock action provides an army with options that lighter forces cannot readily replicate.
As Australia shifts towards a more contested regional environment and an army optimised for littoral manoeuvre, maintaining a capable, armoured force contributes to both operational effectiveness and deterrence.
The value of the Abrams is not measured by how often Australia has deployed tanks in combat, but by the combat power they provide and the strategic options they give government to defend Australia’s interests and deter potential adversaries.
Leave a comment