Second, Moscow has endorsed Beijing’s procedure for South China Sea disputes. Putin and Xi Jinping signed a joint statement (Opens in new window) on 20 May 2026 in which they stated that the dispute should be resolved through negotiations and consultations between the states directly involved. They also firmly opposed interference in the dispute by forces from outside the region. China’s foreign ministry, in turn, used the same formula in July, in a reply (Opens in new window) to fourteen governments marking ten years since the 2016 tribunal ruling (Opens in new window). It pledged to settle the disputes “through negotiation and consultation with countries directly concerned”.
Another Interpreter piece asked in April (Opens in new window) what would follow when Beijing “recalibrates its own approach to the Natunas”. The Tuna gas block, in Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone off the Natuna Islands, lies in waters that China also claims under its nine-dash line (Opens in new window). In 2020, Zarubezhneft, a Russian state oil company, acquired half of the block (Opens in new window). Then, when a rig arrived on 30 June 2021, a Chinese coast guard vessel came to the scene within days, according to Reuters (Opens in new window).Chinese diplomats demanded by letter that Indonesia stop drilling in what they called Chinese territory.
Nevertheless, Jakarta refused the demand and kept the rig at work until 19 November. Throughout these months, Zarubezhneft held half of the block, with Harbour Energy as operator. Interestingly, Russia appears neither in the Reuters account of the stand-off nor in a 2023 Interpreter piece (Opens in new window) on Jakarta’s quiet handling of it, which records that “Premier Oil [renamed Harbour Energy after its 2021 merger with Chrysaor] successfully completed its exploration”. This absence is a sign that Russian ownership gave the field no protection, since Beijing pressed its claim against a block that was already half Russian.
Today, the block is being revived with the same Russian partner in place. In May 2026, Harbour Energy sold its half (Opens in new window) to Indonesia’s Prime Group, and Zarubezhneft told the deputy energy minister it was ready to resume work in June. Meanwhile, Bloomberg Technoz reported (Opens in new window) in October 2025 that sanctions imposed on the Russian company after 2022 had kept the partners from a final investment decision by making financing difficult. In addition, on 8 October the British government added Zarubezhneft (Opens in new window) to its sanctions list as a Russian government-affiliated entity.
A view reported in the South China Morning Post (Opens in new window) in July held the opposite. On this view, Beijing would probably not put its alignment with Moscow at risk to disrupt “a single offshore energy project”. However, the 2021 stand-off suggests otherwise, since Beijing demanded a halt to the drilling while a Russian state company held half of the block. And if Beijing holds back this time, the reason may well lie in its dispute with the Philippines, which the same report described as Beijing’s “existing preoccupation”.
In short, a Russian partner at Tuna adds sanctions risk and gives Jakarta no protection against China. Moreover, Jakarta’s own diplomacy has weakened its position in the North Natuna Sea. Prabowo’s joint statement (Opens in new window) with Xi in November 2024 recorded a “common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims”. The foreign ministry later denied (Opens in new window) that this wording meant recognising the nine-dash line.
Before the partners commit further, the government could establish whether the British listing will cut the field off from finance and insurance. It could also ask whether Zarubezhneft’s nominated oil suppliers would pass a sanctions screening. At the same time, a recent Interpreter piece (Opens in new window) noted that the new foreign minister’s first hearing before Commission I would help clarify “which commitments remain open to review”. That hearing is the place to state on the record that the 2024 joint statement does not cover Tuna.
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