Australia has a new chief of the defence force, Admiral Mark Hammond, and here are three issues he should take on as he charts the course of the nation’s military strategy.
He should establish a National Military Strategy that gives effect to the National Defence Strategy (NDS), push the argument for a policy of long-term deterrence, and complete integration of the five domains of the Australian Defence Force.
Hammond takes command of the ADF at a pivotal time. His likely four-year tenure will span a period of significant strategic risk in the Indo-Pacific. China’s military modernisation continues apace, and the United States has made clear that allies must take on more of the collective burden to balance Beijing’s growing influence and power. Australia’s NDS makes clear that warning time for conflict has all but disappeared. While we plan and spend for the future, the ADF that might go to war would be the one that we have at the time, not the one we hope for in the decades to come.
Hammond hit the ground running on 9 July, promptly inserting ‘command’ back into ADF nomenclature. Last week he retitled the chief of joint operations as commander joint operations, and he’s inserting ‘command’ into various ADF committee structures. These renamings signify increased focus on operations and preparation for warfighting.
Under a long-standing diarchy, the new chief of the defence force (CDF) shares responsibilities with the recently appointed defence secretary, Meghan Quinn, for ensuring that Defence meets Australian government requirements. However, Hammond is responsible for command of the Australian Defence Force under the direction of the Minister for Defence – so the following advice is tailored to this aspect of his role.
First, develop a military strategy to complement the NDS. The second iteration of the biennial NDS has cemented a useful rhythm of strategy reassessment and updates to the Integrated Investment Program replacing ad hoc white papers and updates. A National Military Strategy (NMS) would sit below the NDS. It would put some meat on the bones of the ADF’s five tasks in the NDS by applying locations, resources and timings to them and by assigning responsible commanders. It would turn NDS direction into action. Such a document would be necessarily classified but its overarching principles could be made public.
The government may also choose to create a whole-of-nation National Security Strategy (NSS) above the NDS, and this would help better cohere the objectives of national defence. The US model of a strategy hierarchy – NSS, NDS and NMS – is a good guide here.
Second, drive the case for long-term deterrence. Much has been made in the past few years of President Xi Jinping’s reported direction to the Chinese armed forces to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. In 2021, the then commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Philip Davidson, warned the US Congress of this potential for conflict. What became known as the Davidson window has in part been driving US and allied military modernisation ever since. Now there is a real chance the Davidson window may close next year with a whimper and there will be calls outside Defence for a reassessment of military spending because nothing happened. If 2027 goes by peacefully, there is a strong case to be made by CDF and others that allied deterrence is working and needs reinforcing, not weakening. Perceptions that the threat and the need for deterrence had passed would be missing exactly what Davidson said, which was not that there would be war in 2027 but that Beijing aimed to be ready by then. At no foreseeable time will Beijing drop its ambition to control the island and indeed reshape the global order to better suit its authoritarian needs. Australia must settle in for decades of militarily backing regional deterrence.
Third, drive further integration in the force. The CDF doesn’t control the whole-of-nation integration challenge but does own the integration of the uniformed force. The integration of space and cyber capabilities in the ADF has made great strides in recent years but there is a way to go to achieve full integration of all five domains. The space and cyber domains don’t need to match the navy, army and air force for size and resources, but they should be considered equally as operational components of the integrated force. Continuing to develop the capabilities, identity and esprit de corps of these new and vital components of the ADF will remain fundamental to achieving fully integrated armed forces.
To support all three of these recommended tasks, more spending will be needed, and to support that there needs to be stronger communication to the public. Despite all the peril that is arising in the world, Defence has no strong social license for more spending. The argument needs to be made.
In this respect, Hammond has a personal advantage: he is already proving to have command not only of the ADF but of any room he enters. His capacity for getting a message across, combined with a stronger communications effort across defence, can and should be deployed towards worthy goals for him for the next four years: driving development of an NMS, making the argument for deterrence efforts beyond 2027, and achieving full integration of the ADF.
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