Australia cannot build a resilient space sector while its legal framework remains incomplete and fails to keep pace with commercial change. The rise in corporate space activity means the sector is no longer defined by governments and research institutions but increasingly by private companies. But with countries vying for a share of the emerging space economy, Australia’s regulatory uncertainty risks deterring commercial investment. This has implications not only for Australia’s commercial space sector but also for its long-term security.
Australia currently has only one piece of specialised space legislation – one that establishes a licensing and permitting regime for launches and returns. A House of Representatives standing committee report has noted that this ‘fails to capture the full life of a space operation’.
Most important is the absence of regulations governing commercial satellite remote sensing and space resource ownership.
A 2017 Australian government report recognised that Australia was ‘completely reliant on foreign-owned satellite systems’ for access to data for positioning, timing and navigation (such as GPS) and to electro-optical sensing. The risk in relying even on allies is that they could restrict access to key technologies or data, just as the US government in June suddenly forbade foreign access to an Anthropic AI model.
In this respect, the government’s decision to discontinue the National Space Mission for Earth Observation – which would have established a modest government-sponsored Earth observation capability – was unfortunate. That does not, however, diminish the case for encouraging private investment in Earth observation (also called remote sensing).
International space law provides only a limited framework for commercial remote-sensing data, leaving most regulation to domestic law. Other Indo-Pacific nations, such as the United States and Japan, have therefore developed domestic remote-sensing frameworks that regulate two interconnected areas: the remote-sensing systems themselves and the data they collect. These regimes balance the risk of revealing sensitive military and strategic information with the commercial exploitation of electro-optical sensing and positioning, timing and navigation data.
From a commercial point of view, these regulations provide certainty at both the beginning and the end of the investment cycle. Before investing, companies need to know what compliance hurdles apply to the capabilities they intend to develop. US law, for example, establishes a tiered licensing regime, with additional conditions potentially applying where a system offers capabilities not already widely available. This allows companies to assess the likely regulatory burden before developing advanced sensing capabilities.
Companies must also know that they can lawfully commercialise the data they collect. Japanese law, for example, limits dissemination of certain raw sensing data to certified entities, though some criticise this as being too restrictive. Australia should not replicate these regimes wholesale, but create a legal framework adapted to local conditions that gives investors certainty while safeguarding national security.
The longer-term issue is ownership of space resources. Commercial mining of lunar or asteroid resources remains nascent and will involve long development horizons. Companies must be certain that the resources extracted from space can be owned, transported and sold once they return to Earth. Under current Australian law, this remains uncertain.
Space law expert Adam Janikowski has argued from a Canadian perspective that the country risks losing out on private investment without a clear legal framework for resource extraction – an especially regrettable prospect given its mining industry and resource-finance capital markets. Like Canada, Australia has a robust mining industry and capital markets to boot, but it is unlikely companies will invest the necessary resources unless they are sure they can reap the rewards.
Several allied countries have already moved to reduce uncertainty around space resource ownership. The US, Luxembourg and Japan have enacted legislation recognising private rights over resources recovered from the Moon, asteroids or other celestial bodies.
Australia’s position, however, is more complicated. It is a party to the Moon Treaty, which treats celestial bodies and their natural resources as part of the common heritage of humankind, prevents unilateral exploitation of space resources before a global regulatory framework is developed. At the same time, Australia is party to the Artemis Accords, which, though not legally binding, encourage signatories to develop domestic legal frameworks for resource extraction activities. From an international law point of view, despite official government statements to the contrary, Australia’s obligations under the Moon Treaty and its endorsement of the Artemis Accords are not easily resolved.
From a strategic point of view, however, Australia, with key allies, has effectively committed to supporting a rules-based approach to space resource utilisation with or without a multilateral treaty. If it intends to participate in emerging space resource supply chains, it must provide the legal certainty needed to attract investment before the market matures elsewhere. This may warrant a reassessment of Australia’s commitment to the Moon Treaty.
Regulation is a matter of both certainty and security. Australia must regulate beyond launch to position its industries to compete successfully in tomorrow’s space economy.
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