This week, former Australian Defence Force chief Chris Barrie said he did not see any evidence from China ‘of global aspirations and global dominance aspirations that we’ve seen out of the United States’ . He also called for Australia to scrap the AUKUS submarine program.
Barrie, who was chief of defence force from 1998 to 2002, made the remarks while presenting a report of the so-called inquiry into AUKUS, which he co-authored with former environment minister Peter Garrett. Although presented as an independent assessment, the exercise attracted criticism over its impartiality, with Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy rightly describing it as ‘a stitch-up from day one’.
Barrie’s whataboutism on the United States rests on false equivalence. The US does maintain a worldwide network of military bases, alliances and security commitments. In doing so, it has provided a security foundation for partners without requiring them to change their political values or systems. Yes, its record includes interventions that have been costly, misguided and damaging to its international standing. All of these have been transparent and subject to democratic oversight and review. Australia has participated in some of those campaigns, and from Vietnam to Iraq we have been willing to examine what they achieved and what they cost us.
China has followed a different path. It seeks not partners but vassals. Its military expansion has concentrated heavily on the western Pacific, where geography, trade and territorial disputes give it strong incentives to seek greater control. Its economic influence extends much further, supported by investment, infrastructure and commercial relationships across the world.
Barrie’s benign view of China would leave Taiwan, the Philippines and Japan, among others, at the whim of an emboldened and aggressive major power that believes much of the region, from the East China Sea to the South China Sea, including Taiwan, is indeed its territory. So it’s no wonder that Taiwan, the Philippines and Japan have looked to global US military reach to help them.
China doesn’t need to match that reach to fundamentally change the balance of power in our region. Beijing can achieve much of what it wants just by becoming powerful enough to give its neighbours, including Australia, little choice but obedience.
Consider the South China Sea. Beijing has spent years building and militarising artificial islands, establishing a persistent presence in waters claimed by several of its neighbours. Chinese coast guard vessels have repeatedly confronted Philippine ships.
These encounters show how military and paramilitary power can change behaviour without a conventional war. A country that’s strong enough can steadily increase the cost of resistance until smaller neighbours begin caving in.
Coercion needn’t be military. When Australia said what China didn’t want to hear about the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, it suffered Chinese trade restrictions.
None of this means Australia should abandon engagement with China. Our economic relationship remains substantial, and managing disagreements without letting them escalate is an important diplomatic task. But engagement works better when countries retain the capacity to make their own decisions.
Australia’s reliance on the United States does deserve scrutiny, particularly given the unpredictability of American foreign policy. Washington’s willingness to support its allies cannot always be taken for granted, and Australia needs to plan accordingly. But uncertainty about US commitments doesn’t diminish the challenge posed by China’s growing military power. If anything, it increases the importance of Australia’s own defence capabilities and its relationships with regional partners.
AUKUS is not beyond scrutiny. Its submarine element is expensive, technically demanding and dependent on industrial capacity in three countries. The timetable stretches across decades, while Australia’s immediate defence requirements continue to grow. Questions about AUKUS’s affordability, delivery schedule and opportunity costs are entirely reasonable.
Yet any alternative needs to address the circumstances that led Australia to pursue nuclear-powered submarines. China’s military modernisation, including nuclear-armed submarines, will continue regardless of whether Australia proceeds with AUKUS. China’s military advances likely cannot be countered without AUKUS.
Australia’s task is to determine which capabilities will give it the greatest freedom of action and which partnerships will help preserve a regional balance that discourages coercion.
The US alliance gives Australia access to intelligence, technology and military capabilities that we could hardly develop alone. Much of our defence capability also depends on continued American support, from weapons and spare parts to software. Australia’s defence planning needs to account for the possibility that this support may not always be available when we need it. A more independent Australian defence posture will require sustained investment in our own capabilities and industrial capacity. It will also require closer cooperation with regional partners whose interests overlap with ours, even when their approaches to China differ from ours.
Former defence chiefs should contribute to these discussions. Their experience gives them a valuable perspective, and disagreement over major defence investments is healthy. But experience doesn’t exempt an argument from scrutiny. China turns out not to be the China that we hoped for when Barrie was chief of the defence force.
Beijing is acquiring the military power to shape events across the Indo-Pacific, and its willingness to use economic and military pressure is already evident. Our defence choices should be judged against that.
Leave a comment