The Indonesian Ulama Council or Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) is currently preparing a draft bill to criminalise lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ) people. The proposed bill aims to prevent ‘LGBTQ activities’ in public spaces and to counter ‘pro-LGBTQ campaigns’.
MUI’s stance on LGBTQ in Indonesia has long been crystal clear. In 2014, it issued a fatwa stating that homosexuality is forbidden (haram).
During debate over revision of the Criminal Code (KUHP), MUI actively lobbied legislators to include anti-homosexuality provisions in the new penal code. This was unsuccessful because there was no specific offence criminalising same-sex relations in the Code.
However, this new bill to criminalise LGBTQ activities is a much bigger threat.
A non-military threat
This is because MUI’s justification for the bill aligns with President Prabowo Subianto’s Presidential Regulation 111 of 2025 on the General Policy for State Defence 2025-2029, which classifies LGBTQ people as a ‘threat’ to national defence.
In its elucidation (explanatory memorandum), the presidential regulation divides threats to the state defence into three categories: military, non-military, and hybrid. ‘Non-military’ is defined as ‘unarmed efforts or activities that endanger and threaten the nation’s sovereignty, the territorial integrity of the country, and the safety of the entire nation.’ ‘Spreading the culture of LGBTQ’ is specifically included here as a ‘non-military threat.’
This is a new feature that was not mentioned in the predecessor regulation (8 of 2021) issued by President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo.
Prabowo’s regulation now creates a securitisation framework that can be used by the state to construct LGBTQ individuals as a threat to the state’s defence. This not only risks strengthening anti-LGBTQ sentiments but also supports attempts to criminalise related activities.
This ‘othering’ strategy is hardly new. The Prabowo administration has been framing legitimate criticism against the government as ‘foreign interests’-driven and has drafted legislation on foreign interference to securitise the issue. This regulation follows the same pattern.
Besides LGBTQ people, ‘non-military threats’ in the regulation include ‘the spread of banned ideologies, the erosion of nationalist values, and the spread of atheism.’ This vague category of activities, often publicly framed as being ‘against national interests’, has historically been exploited and abused to persecute and silence critics. The new regulation’s ambiguity is only exacerbated by the grouping of these activities with criminal offences such as online gambling.
As stated in its elucidation, ‘non-military defence prepared to face non-military threats is implemented by ministries/institutions outside the defence institution, as the main element, and is supported by other elements of state power.’ This means MUI, as a quasi-state institution, can also be involved in these efforts against so-called non-military threats.
This regulation is intended as an implementing law, a follow-up to Law No 3 of 2002 on the State Defence. Coordinating Minister for Law, Human Rights, Immigration and Correctional Affairs Yusril Ihza Mahendra has stated that it therefore cannot be used to persecute LGBTQ individuals, although this offers little comfort to Indonesians now being presented as a ‘threat’ to national defence.
In any case, the problems with this regulation go beyond its text.
A common enemy
President Prabowo signed Presidential Regulation 111 on 24 October 2025, shortly after the August-September 2025 riots that involved intra-elite conflicts.
This timing means the regulation is likely connected to elites’ reconsolidation of power relations. It facilitates efforts to bolster military forces, including by constructing ‘threats’ that smooth the path for increased militarisation.
Moreover, the openly anti-LGBTQ stance of the regulation has opened a space for conservative Islamic groups to reforge their alliance with Prabowo, who abandoned his Islamic backers in 2019, when he joined the cabinet of his former rival, President Jokowi.
Shared interests in opposing LGBTQ people through security narratives could pave the way for re-establishing the once-strong alliance between Prabowo and Islamic groups that faded after he became a minister.
Such an alliance would be a valuable source of political support that could help Prabowo navigate the internal fragmentation of elites since he took power, which has been proven politically and economically costly for him.
A MUI-TNI alliance?
What can be observed from this connection between religious and military interests?
A potential alliance between MUI and the military could significantly intensify anti-LGBTQ sentiments in Indonesia.
In a Muslim majority country, the role of MUI has been crucial in shaping religion-related policies. Consisting of scholars from various Islamic organisations, mostly on the conservative side, MUI is the most authoritative Islamic voice in Indonesia and the strongest religious influence on community attitudes.
While a renewed MUI campaign against LGBTQ individuals is not unexpected, its potential alliance with the military to boost anti-LGBTQ sentiments in the country is very alarming. This alliance would not be based on theological considerations alone. Religious narratives, as history has shown, are easily weaponised to serve profane, if not even ungodly, political purposes.
A good example can be traced back to the mass persecution of homosexuals in the Netherlands Indies in the 1930s. Historian Marieke Bloembergen noted that the pattern of ‘hunting’ homosexuals took place in a period of political and economic insecurity, and in a society marked by sharp political divisions. The witch hunt conducted by the moral police, was part of establishing an image of ‘civilised’ police in a repressive colonial state.
Persistent homophobia in the contemporary political sphere may also complicate the situation. In a YouTube video posted on 30 April 2026, politician Amien Rais accused Prabowo’s close aide, Cabinet Secretary Teddy Indra Wijaya, of being gay. This was quickly followed by widespread mocking content about Teddy, whom many elites had previously criticised for being a strict gatekeeper when they wanted meetings with Prabowo.
The State Palace has not officially responded to the accusation. However, the Presidential Regulation could be seen as a way for Prabowo to quash gossip that he and some of his aides are gay.
When the Presidential Regulation sparked controversies, some social media accounts rode on the shaming of Prabowo’s circle, using anti-LGBTQ narratives as a criticism of the government.
Cannon fodder
The problem is that homophobic narratives rarely affect the political elites, but rather people in the middle and lower economies.
Only recently, a group of vigilantes ‘hunted’ local transgenders in Bogor, West Java, claiming that they were ‘cleansing’ the city of LGBTQ people, who are, once again, being used as cannon fodder for the political battles of the elite.
Whatever political games are at play on this issue, efforts to frame LGBTQ people as a non-military threat and efforts to criminalise sexuality will only open more avenues for persecution, mostly for the underprivileged.
It will likely be used as a pretext for security forces to further encroach on people’s privacy. In this scenario, everyone, not just the LGBTQ community, is at risk.
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