Teodoro’s visit to Darwin and Australia-Philippine defence ties – Views from ASPI analysts

On 6 to 7 August 2026, Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilbert Teodoro visited Darwin on the tail end of Exercise Pitch Black 2026, where he met Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles. The visit offered an opportunity to take stock of a deepening defence relationship shaped by growing strategic convergence, expanding military cooperation and shared concerns about regional security. It also highlighted northern Australia’s growing importance as a hub for engagement with Southeast Asian partners.

ASPI analysts provide their views on the significance of Teodoro’s visit, the trajectory of Australia-Philippines defence cooperation and what may come next for the bilateral relationship:

Fitriani, senior analyst

Since upgrading relations to a Strategic Partnership in 2023, Canberra and Manila have increased the tempo and complexity of joint exercises, maritime cooperative activities and personnel exchanges. This closer alignment reflects shared concerns about maintaining a rules-based regional order and China’s growing use of hybrid threats, particularly the pressure faced by the Philippines in the South China Sea. Their interests are increasingly complementary. Australia needs capable and interoperable partners across its northern approaches, while the Philippines needs partners that can maintain a regional presence and operate alongside its forces in an increasingly contested maritime environment.

The priority now should be turning this increased tempo into routine interoperability through logistics, access, information-sharing, joint planning and incident response. There is also scope to expand the strategic relationship. Teodoro’s emphasis on convergence beyond defence, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, provides opportunities to strengthen cooperation on maritime security, cyber resilience and critical infrastructure. From a resilience perspective, both countries benefit from strengthening each other,  because, ultimately, collective security is only as strong as its weakest link.

Gatra Priyandita, senior analyst

Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy increasingly rests on weaving a latticework of overlapping partnerships – with Japan, the United States and a widening set of Southeast Asian and Pacific states – in which no single relationship carries the whole load. The Philippines has become one of its more consequential nodes. Hosting Teodoro in Darwin, on the margins of a Pitch Black drawing 21 nations, lets Canberra display the role it covets: one not just of a bilateral partner but of an organiser of collective capability. The commitment to the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus maritime security activity in September, and the deference to mechanisms led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, emphasise that Australia is becoming a thickener of regional architecture.

David Dutton, senior resident fellow

Teodoro’s visit to Darwin followed several incidents in the past few months between Chinese and Philippine vessels in the South China Sea. The joint statement issued by Teodoro and Marles described China’s actions as aggressive, destabilising and dangerous. This strongly reiterated support for freedom of navigation and overflight, the 2016 arbitral award against China’s South China Sea claims, and peaceful resolution of disputes.

Most striking was continued progress towards collective action to sustain international law against direct threats. The statement declared that ‘states must not take actions that undermine UNCLOS or affect other states’ enjoyment of rights under UNCLOS’, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Enhanced operational coordination between the Philippines, Australia, Japan and the United States through their Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Cooperation Council was the identified mechanism. Terms for this expanded four-country arrangement were signed on 29 May without wide publicity but provide for regular ‘multilateral maritime activities to sustain persistent, deterrence-reinforcing presence’, including in the Philippine exclusive economic zone. Teodoro’s visit marked another step in bolstering collective action and deterrence, fitting both countries’ recognition that sustaining maritime rights depends on collective action.

Rachel Vandenbrink, senior analyst

In all the public commentary about the Philippines and the South China Sea, the region’s other conflict flashpoint, Taiwan, flew under the radar. The joint statement cautiously affirmed the ‘importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,’ but neither minister mentioned Taiwan at the press conference. That limited reference comes as Philippine leaders have taken an increasingly direct stance on a possible Chinese attempt at seizing Taiwan.  In July, Teodoro said the Philippines would be ‘involved’ because of its geographic proximity and citizens on the island.

Yet the meeting underscored how much closer the two militaries are getting in ways that would matter in a Taiwan crisis. Marles praised infrastructure support to Philippine bases as ‘underpinning a much greater Australian presence.’ Teodoro noted that the two militaries were practising closer coordination across air, land and sea. Both ministers expect a Defence Cooperation Agreement by year-end, which Marles said would be ‘transformative’ and which Teodoro said would allow the two sides to work in ‘broader areas.’ As this integration deepens, it could prompt more detailed conversations about the two sides’ assumptions, expectations and potential roles in a Taiwan contingency.

Eric Frecon, visiting fellow

On the Philippines’ domestic front, a June survey found that 86 percent of Filipinos agreed that the government should defend the South China Sea with like-minded countries. In an annual survey of Southeast Asian elites, the Philippines has ranked Australia fourth among third parties with which ‘to hedge’ against the uncertainties of US-China rivalry, just behind Japan, the European Union, and Britain. In the face of deepening strategic competition, there is rising interest in the Philippines in engaging Middle Powers – particularly with a 9.6 percent drop in support for the US since 2025. Diversification is in the air.

Canberra should capitalise on this by moving beyond routine, operational interactions to a more strategic, ministerial level. But it should not mistake convergence for alignment. Manila continues to preserve channels with Beijing, while energy insecurity has revived discussion of joint oil and gas development in the South China Sea. Even if this is clearly a ‘chimera’, the issue has resurfaced as a wake-up call for Canberra.