Lessons from the US–Iran war will be long analysed, but as neighbouring Gulf states grapple with the fallout, one clear message is that countries close to a conflict cannot choose the effect it has on them. For South Korea, this is a reminder that geostrategic realities can impose unwanted conditions no matter what policies it pursues.
This means that South Korea must prepare now for any potential war over Taiwan. Distracted by China, the United States will not have the capacity to defend South Korea if North Korea chooses to capitalise on the disruption and attack. Seoul will also likely need to provide some military support to the US, as well as military protection to vessels rerouted by sea lane closures.
Although Taiwan, the most likely source of escalation between the US and China, is more than 1000 km from South Korea, China’s geographic dominance and capabilities combined with North Korea’s persistent threat ensure that Seoul has little room to manoeuvre should war break out. Given the challenges such a conflict would pose for South Korea, entirely sitting it out is not a real strategic option.
Whenever Washington is involved in a conflict, Seoul must assess the effect on alliance readiness and national interests. A Taiwan conflict would require substantial US military effort, far beyond what we have seen in the Middle East. The US may sustain significant losses that may take years to recover even if it wins – and there is no guarantee that it will.
Consequently, South Korea must rely to a far greater extent on its own military capabilities to deter conventional or even nuclear attacks from North Korea, which may look to exploit US distraction or weakness. Therefore, shouldering a greater burden for its own defence should not be framed solely as a domestic political strategy or a response to US demands. Rather, it reflects the reality that during peer warfare in the Indo-Pacific, the US may be unable to conduct simultaneous high intensity operations.
The US–South Korea alliance will also be tested as Seoul attempts to meet US expectations and contribute to the regional conflict. Primarily, South Korea will be obliged to protect US military forces and civilians living on the peninsula. In addition, the US is increasingly emphasising the potential role of US Forces Korea (USFK) as well as the capacity of South Korea’s military and industry in regional scenarios. USFK commander Xavier Brunson in May described South Korea as the ‘dagger in the heart of Asia’. He has also highlighted the need for industrial resilience and South Korea’s role in providing sustainment support to US forces throughout the Pacific theatre.
It is difficult to judge the extent to which the US would use the Korean Peninsula as a logistical or operational base in a China contingency. But given the strategic context, it would be highly beneficial for Seoul to plan for a worst-case scenario even though experts consider a direct Chinese attack on South Korean territory to be unlikely. The short-term goal may be to avoid risk by limiting support, but the long-term consequences for the alliance could be catastrophic. Washington is unlikely to forget allies who are reticent when it is fighting a peer in the Indo-Pacific.
Even if Washington concedes to minimal military support from Seoul, South Korea’s military, society and economy will still need to make significant adjustments. The extant power of South Korea’s military along with US forces stationed on the peninsula give Beijing an operational dilemma that it will need to manage. South Korea’s operational load therefore will be extremely high given the need to monitor and respond to Chinese activity while simultaneously deterring North Korea by itself.
No matter what path South Korea chooses, it must expect that its major sea lanes of communication will be heavily disrupted. Any conflict or crisis over Taiwan will effectively close off access to the East China Sea and South China Sea, with South Korean ships forced to use east coast ports and reroute through the Sea of Japan, using the Pacific route to the Middle East or Europe. Not only will this disrupt South Korean economic activity, it will also require Seoul to provide military protection to vessels and pursue greater cooperation and coordination with Washington and Tokyo to deconflict and optimise such operations.
This does not mean that South Korea must set a course right now. That would be dangerous given its proximity to and economic relationship with China, ongoing alterations to the structure of the US alliance, and the reality that any conflict between the two powers would be highly contextual with escalation dynamics that are difficult to predict. But it would be equally damaging to avoid contingency planning and enhancing political, economic and societal resilience against such a conflict. While a war in the Taiwan Strait is by no means guaranteed, South Korea must prepare to manage the consequences now to offset its worst potential effects.
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